A „modern” társadalmi szerződéselméletek problémái
The paper provides a game theory interpretation of some classical and modern theories of contract. After describing the general structure of contractarian justification of political obligations it classifies Hobbesian and Lockean theories with respect to the differences in the formal interpretation of their conceptions of ¬state of nature. Choosers in Hobbesian state of nature must face a situation which can be represented as a Prisoner’s Dilemma in its structure. In such a situation collective (Pareto) optimality and individual rationality (the non-cooperative strategy, as the solution of the game) come into conflict so that a massive intervention is invoked to make them harmonize. Lockean state of nature can however be interpreted as an Assurance Game in which the cooperative strategy could be dominant with minimal interventionalism. The author conludes that while Hobbesian justification of political obligation leads to paradoxes, the Lockean interpretation too gives rise to serious difficulties. He suggests that the possible solution of the problem may be founded on Rawlsian interpretation of state of nature as a rational decision under uncertainty.